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I. OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the District Court is reported at, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 540 F.2d. 1039 (10th Cir. 1976).
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court is reported at 436 U.S. 46 (1978).
II. STATUTES INVOLVED
A. Statute Of Santa Clara Pueblo'
December 15, 1939
Be it ordained by the Council of the Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico, in regular
meeting duly assembled, that hereafter, the following rules shall govern the admission
to membership to the Santa Clara Pueblo.
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. That children born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
and nonmembers shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and
nonmembers shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo under any
circumstances.
B. 25 U. S. Code § 1302. Constitutional Rights2
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall --
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive
any person of liberty or property without due process of law;...
III. QUESTION PRESENTED
Can federal courts grant equitable relief to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. 1301, et seq.?
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Santa Clara Pueblo is an Indian nation that owns and occupies ancestral land in
New Mexico of about 48,000 acres. At the time of trial, there were about 1200
members of the Pueblo, most of whom resided on Pueblo land. The Pueblo's
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traditional language is Tewa. Its officials are Governor Lucario Padilla and the Pueblo
Council.
Petitioner Julia Martinez is a member and lifelong resident of Santa Clara
Pueblo and of full Santa Clara ancestry. Her husband, Myles Martinez, is of full
Navajo Indian ancestry and has resided at the Santa Clara Pueblo since his 1941
marriage to Julia, except for his military service in World War 11. Their children,
petitioner Audrey Martinez and her brothers and sisters, are thus of full Indian ancestry
and half Santa Clara ancestry. Until the decision below, they were lifelong Pueblo
residents, except for their time away at school. All the Martinez children speak and
understand Tewa, the traditional and official language of the Pueblo; observe
traditional customs; and are accepted into the religion of the Pueblo. These facts led
the district court to find that the Martinez children "are culturally, for all practical
purposes, Santa Clara Indians." 3  The Court of Appeals concluded that they "are,
culturally, members of the Pueblo."4
In 1935, the Pueblo adopted a constitution pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476.5 The constitution grants power to determine
membership questions to the Pueblo Council. Membership determinations by the
Council affect a wide range of rights, both tribal and federal. Only Pueblo members
have tribal political rights, enjoy material benefits such as land use rights, and have the
right to remain living at the Pueblo. Many federal benefits are also expressly
contingent upon membership in an Indian tribe.
Denial of membership has caused hardship to the Martinez family, especially in
obtaining federal medical care available to Indians. In 1968, Julia Martinez's now-
deceased daughter Natalie, suffering from strokes associated with her terminal illness,
was refused emergency medical treatment by the Indian Health Service. This was
solely because her mother had previously been unable to obtain tribal recognition for
her. Only after meeting with Interior Department solicitors did Mrs. Martinez obtain
Bureau of Indian Affairs census numbers for her children. At the time of trial, the
Martinez children were encountering no difficulties in receiving medical care, as
Respondents have noted. Since then, however, Martinez grandchildren have had
problems in obtaining medical care from the Indian Health Service.
In addition, those of the Martinez children who are grown are unable to obtain
Pueblo land assignments upon which to make homes of their own. To stay on the
Pueblo, they must reside with their mother or another member relative.
Suit was filed on September 22, 1972, in the District Court for the District of
New Mexico, against the Pueblo, its governor, and the members of the Pueblo
6Council. Respondents pled lack of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, failure to
exhaust tribal remedies, and general denial on the merits.7 Motions to dismiss were
8
denied, and trial to the Court was held November 25-27, 1974. Judgment for
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Respondents was entered on June 25, 1975. 9
Respondents claimed at trial that the 1939 Pueblo Ordinance was essential to
the religious heritage of the Pueblo, but the district court found that it is unrelated to
the Pueblo religion. 10 Traditional Santa Clara society frowned on mixed marriages by
either sex, and prior to the 1930's, mixed marriages at the Pueblo were rare. The few
cases of children of such marriages were handled case-by-case based on cultural and
religious affinity to the Pueblo." This traditional rule is codified in the Pueblo
Constitution of 1935, which mentions no discrimination. The principal purpose of the
1939 Ordinance was to reduce claims to Pueblo land and money.' 2 As late as 1942,
the Pueblo contemplated exceptions to the Ordinance upon payment of a fee. Based on
these facts, the district court stated that the Ordinance represented a "break with
tradition."' 13 The Ordinance, which mandates the membership of male-line children
without regard to cultural or religious affinity, is thus not a traditional rule as
Respondents claim.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on August 18, 1976.14 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the action
dismissed for lack of a federal cause of action on May 15, 1978.15 The Supreme Court
held that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction.16 It ruled that the Pueblo
enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit, which was not abrogated by the ICRA. 17 The
Court stated that the suit could be maintained against Governor Padilla and other
Pueblo officials for prospective relief by analogy to Ex parte Young. 18 The Court held
that there is no federal cause of action to enforce the Act except for habeas corpus to
challenge tribal custody. 19 Therefore, the Court ordered the action to be dismissed."
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The ICRA's legislative history demonstrates that the purpose of the Act is to
guarantee to persons under tribal jurisdiction the same constitutional rights enjoyed by
other Americans. Federal remedies under the ICRA cannot be limited to habeas
corpus. If they were, rights conferred on persons under tribal authority would be
greatly inferior to the rights enjoyed by others, contrary to Congress' intent. The
legislative history demonstrates specific congressional concern with the denial of an
equitable remedy by the federal courts in cases involving tribal membership, free
exercise of religion, and tribal taxing power. By contrast there is no support in the
history for an intent to confine remedies to habeas corpus. Relevant decisions of the
Supreme Court sustain the jurisdiction of the district courts over analogous cases
denying basic rights. For many years the remedy of habeas corpus has been broadly
governed by statute, while the equitable powers of the federal courts have not except
for specific limitations. Congress followed this tradition in the ICRA.
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Underlying the question of remedies to enforce the ICRA is a policy issue of
profound importance to all Indian nations, that of jurisdiction over nonmembers. The
ICRA was Congress's attempt to provide a just basis for Indian nations to govern all
residents of their territories. The decision below, in light of other recent Supreme
Court decisions, portends restriction of tribal jurisdiction to members.
The Supreme Court's rulings on sovereign immunity, which Petitioners accept,
protect tribes against retroactive relief. This is the same protection enjoyed by the state
and federal governments. Jurisdiction to grant only prospective, equitable relief has
long been a basic rule of constitutional law that balances the sovereign interest of
governments against the need to enforce the civil rights of individuals. In light of this,
and the intent of Congress in enacting the ICRA, Congress cannot have intended to
exclude traditional equitable relief.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. Congress Intended a Federal Cause of Action for Equitable Enforcement of
the ICRA.
Petitioners contend that the Supreme Court erred in denying a federal cause of
action for equitable enforcement of the ICRA. This conclusion is supported by the
purpose, language, and legislative history of the Act, by ICRA precedents in the lower
courts, and by analogous precedents in the Supreme Court.
1. ICRA Precedents.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in this case, lower federal courts had
unanimously found a federal cause of action for prospective equitable enforcement of
the ICRA.21
2. Background and Purpose of the ICRA.
The manifest purpose of the ICRA is to impose enumerated standards of the
Constitution on self-governing Indian tribes. 22 The standards are taken, mostly
verbatim, from the Constitution23 and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.24
The legislative history of the ICRA involved extensive hearings beginning in
1961, yielding four hearing reports between 1961 and 1965,2 and summary reports on
the hearings by the Subcommittee Staff in 1964 and 1966.26 Senator Ervin and other
Subcommittee members introduced bills in the 88th Congress (S.3047) and 89th
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Congress (S.961), each of which would have imposed on Indian tribes the same
limitations that the Constitution imposes on the federal government. Neither bill ever
got as far as a full committee report.28 In 1965, the Interior Department suggested
substituting an enumerated list of rights for the direct application of the Constitution.
The Subcommittee accepted Interior Department's concept. 29 A bill was introduced
into the 90th Congress as S.1843 and sent to Committee. 30 The Senate Judiciary
Committee voted out the bill and issued the only committee report on any of these
bills. The full Senate unanimously passed S.1843 on December 7, 1967. 3'
Impatient with slow action in the House, Senator Ervin also persuaded the
Senate to add the full text of S.1843 as a floor amendment to H.R. 2516, which dealt
with other civil rights matters and had already passed the House. 32 The Senate passed
H.R. 2516 with the Indian rights addition on March 11, 1968. 33
The House began committee hearings on the separate Indian rights bill (S. 1843)
and a House version (H.R. 15419) on March 29, 1968. 34 But on April 10, 1968, the
full House passed H.R. 2516 with the Indian rights amendment.
35
As this summary shows, the only committee report on any of the bills leading
to the ICRA is the Senate Judiciary Committee Report. Throughout this report, and the
Staff Reports mentioned above, the reference is uniform to the constitutional rights
being imposed, and there are frequent statements that the limitations are the same as
those imposed on the federal and state governments.
36
Petitioners submit that the right to judicial review is a necessary part of
constitutional limitations. Without meaningful judicial review, the ICRA rights would
be so much inferior to the rights protected by the Constitution as to contradict the
statement of purpose.
3. Equitable Remedies.
The Indian Bill of Rights expressly guarantees the federal remedy of habeas
corpus from tribal custody.37" The Supreme Court held that this remedy is exclusive of
all others.38 This holding should be rejected, because the habeas remedy will not fulfill
many of the manifest purposes of the ICRA. It would not fulfill specific purposes
indicated by the legislative history, and there is no indication that Congress intended
habeas to be the sole remedy. The Supreme Court has generally sustained remedies in
analogous civil rights cases, and habeas has long been a statutory remedy while
equitable relief has not.
Many of the rights enumerated in the Indian Bill of Rights would rarely, if ever,
arise in the context of tribal custody. Taking of property, taxation without due process,
warrantless searches, bills of attainder, denial of equal rights to vote, freedom of the
press, the right of peaceable assembly, the right to petition for redress of grievances, or
Petitioner's Brief
free speech -- all frequently or exclusively occur absent custody. Even criminal
procedural rights can be denied in proceedings ending in non-custody punishments
such as a fine, restitution, loss of land use rights, or banishment from the reservation.
The ICRA will be an empty undertaking indeed if these rights lacked federal remedy.
As noted above, the general purpose of the Indian Bill of Rights was to give
persons under tribal jurisdiction the same constitutional rights that other Americans
enjoy under the state and federal governments.39 Since everyone has access to
equitable remedies for non-custody violations of rights by federal and state
governments, denial of equitable remedies against tribes will not be the same; it will be
greatly inferior.
The legislative history also indicates the intent to alter the legal effect of prior
federal court decisions denying a remedy to persons denied basic rights in non-custody
circumstances. 4 0 As previously stated, there is only one committee report on the bill
that became the ICRA or any of its predecessors. 4' This report discusses the "denial of
rights by tribal governments" principally by discussing seven reported federal court
42opinions that had denied a remedy to persons under tribal jurisdiction. Five of these
seven were civil cases, where a habeas remedy would not apply. One of these was
Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, which was a challenge by non-Indians to a tribal tax. 259
F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959). The others were:
Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
960 (1958), involving a dispute over tribal membership; Native American Church v.
Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) and Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez,
119 F.Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954), considering claimed denials of free exercise of
religion; and Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956), which was
a challenge by Indians to a tribal tax. The Iron Crow case also involved challenges to
criminal convictions by two Indians; only one conviction involved a jail sentence.
43
Furthermore, in referring to both Barta and Iron Crow, the Senate Committee Report
expressed concern over due process requirements in taxation.
44
The focus on these cases was not confined to the Committee. When the bill
(S.1843 from the 90th Congress) was introduced into the Senate, Senator Ervin
inserted an analysis of the same seven cases into the Congressional Record.45 The same
cases were also pointed out to the House Subcommittee in its hearings just prior to
enactment of the ICRA.46 By contrast, there is no support in the legislative history for
an intent to confine all remedies for rights violations to habeas corpus.
The general rule regarding equitable remedies for constitutional violations was
stated in Bell v. Hood:
[I]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of
federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the
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Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the
14th Amendment forbids the state to do. Moreover, where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning
that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.
47
The equitable power of the federal courts described by the Supreme Court in the cases
just cited has traditionally been characterized as an inherent power of the courts
exercised in accordance with principles of equity evolved from the chancery courts.
Congress has recognized this by occasionally acting to limit the power. 48 By contrast,
habeas corpus has for many years been governed by statute. 49 The Constitution (art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2) limits Congress' ability to control the writ, but the practice of defining the
remedy by statute is well-established. Congress followed this practice by including in
the ICRA a statutory right of habeas corpus.50 This section also substitutes for the
constitutional limitation itself, to which the tribes are not subject. In light of these
traditions, congressional intent to deny normal equitable remedies should not be
implied from a habeas statute absent the clearest indications.
B. Tribal Sovereignty is Better Served by Equitable Enforcement of the ICRA.
1. Petitioners Seek Only the Same Prospective Relief Available Against
State and Federal Officers.
The Court below held that the ICRA did not abrogate the traditional immunity
from suit of the Indian nations. 51 But the Court also held that Governor Padilla and
other Pueblo officers are "not protected by the tribe's immunity from suit," by analogy
to Ex parte Young.52 The Court also relied on its prior decision in Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Dept. of Game.
53
Petitioners have not asked this Court to review the Supreme Court ruling
holding the Santa Clara Pueblo immune from suit without its consent. Throughout this
litigation, Petitioners have sought only prospective, equitable relief of the sort
available under Ex parte Young and its counterparts involving federal officials. As
Santa Clara Indians, Petitioners have an interest in tribal sovereignty and seek to limit
their remedy to the same remedy that litigants have against the state and federal
governments. For like reasons, Petitioners accept the rule developed in lower federal
courts requiring exhaustion of internal tribal remedies as a condition to federal court
jurisdiction. 54  Petitioners complied with this rule by exhausting all tribal remedies
within the Santa Clara Pueblo.
55
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Jurisdiction to grant prospective, equitable relief against tribal officers is
supported by the legislative history of the ICRA. For example, the 1966
Subcommittee Staff Report of Hearings begins with a two and one-half page
discussion titled, "Tribal Sovereignty and Its Limitation by Federal Authority." 56 It is
clear that the senators knew that the very enactment of an Indian Bill of Rights would
be a federal limitation on tribal sovereignty.
In considering sovereign immunity, it is important to distinguish between
actions such as this one, seeking equitable relief against future conduct of a
government violating basic constitutional rights, from actions seeking damages from
the governmental treasury for past wrongs. The judicial power of the United States has
long been held to extend to actions for equitable relief from the future unconstitutional
acts of governmental officers. 57 By contrast, actions for money judgments (or even
equitable restitution) for past wrongs have required explicit waivers of immunity.
Actions involving title to property and certain kinds of contract rights are also
protected. No circuit court of appeals has sustained a money judgment against an
Indian tribe under the ICRA; the decisions cited above involved equitable relief.
The right to redress against overbearing and unconstitutional government
action represented by Ex parte Young has long been a basic rule of constitutional law.
In light of this well-established principle, and of Congress' clear intent to guarantee to
persons under Indian tribal jurisdiction the "same" rights as other Americans and to
remedy the injustice of prior cases denying relief in non-custody cases, it is
inconceivable that Congress did not intend traditional equitable relief to be available.
2. The Relief Sought by Petitioners Will Promote and Accommodate
Recognition of Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Members.
The Supreme Court recently held that tribes lack jurisdiction to punish non-
Indians for violations of tribal criminal law within tribal territory.58 In the same term,
the Court sustained tribal criminal jurisdiction over a member but in dictum implied
that tribes lack jurisdiction over all nonmembers, Indian or not. 59 These decisions do
not address the important question of Indian nations' civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers.
However, in enacting the ICRA, Congress did consider tribal civil jurisdiction.
One of the decisions that Congress disapproved for lack of a federal remedy was Barta
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe.60 This was an action by non-Indians seeking judicial review of
validity of a tribal tax. Plainly, Congress thought it was pro-viding persons like the
Barta plaintiffs with a federal remedy. The Supreme Court has now taken that remedy
away. If this decision is allowed to stand, it leaves nonmembers with no federal rights
against tribes. This not only contravenes Congress's plan, but when read with some of
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the bill of rights language in the Oliphant opinion, it portends extension of that
decision into the civil realm.
6 1
Properly interpreted, Congress intended the ICRA as a limited intrusion into
tribal authority to accommodate modern concepts of constitutional rights, limited to
prospective, equitable remedies like those available against the state and federal
governments. The accommodation looked to give nonmembers federal judicial review
of tribal authority exercised over them. The Supreme Court has taken its own path,
ostensibly out of respect for tribal sovereignty. Its decision should be seen in larger
compass as pointing toward a greater restriction of tribes than that intended by
Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should sustain federal court jurisdiction to
award equitable relief against tribal officers for violations of the Indian Bill of Rights.
Respectfully Submitted,
Richard B. Collins
Counsel for the Petitioner
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